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The UN operation in former Yugosla- 
via has been the object of much criti- 
cism. Some of the criticism has focused 
on the alleged ineffectiveness of the 
new concept of Safe Areas that has 
been applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(BiH). 
Any analysis of the contribution of 
the 6 Safe Areas in BiH (Srebrenica, 
Zepa, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Tuzla and 
Bihac) should take into account two 
inescapable facts relating to physical 
safety: BiH's Muslim refugees and dis- 
placed persons are returning or going 
to some of the Safe Areas in BiH; and 
UNHCR + UNPROFOR field person- 
nel constantly assert that Safe Areas 
have saved lives. 
It should be remembered that the 
Safe Areas were declared in a highly 
charged political context where there 
was considerable international pres- 
sure on the UN Security Council to in- 
tervene in favour of one of the parties 
in the armed conflict in BiH. By declar- 
ing that certain localities that were con- 
trolled by the Muslims were to "be 
treated as Safe Areas by all parties con- 
cerned," the UNSC hoped to achieve at 
least three objectives: 
offer protection for threatened ci- 
vilian populations; 
relieve pressure on it to intervene 
more forcefully and directly in fa- 
vour of the Muslims by appearing 
to take a position against the Serbs; 
assist the Muslims by attributing to 
them a minimal amount of territory 
in anticipation of the inevitable par- 
tition of BiH. 
There were other towns and cities that 
were threatened by the Muslim forces 
(Doboj, Brcko) or being slowly de- 
stroyed by both the Croat and Muslim 
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forces (Mostar), yet these did not war- 
rant the attention of the international 
news media or the UNSC. Safe Areas 
were therefore declared to directly 
help certain threatened populations 
and one party (Muslim forces loyal to 
BiH President Izetbegovic) in an inter- 
nal armed conflict that involved at 
least two other parties. 
It should be kept in mind that the 
initial UNSC resolutions (819 & 824) 
declaring the Safe Areas did not com- 
mit the UN to militarily defend those 
areas. It was only later that the UNSC 
decided to allow a dramatic extension 
of UNPROFOR's mandate (resolution 
836) by enabling it "to deter attacks 
against the Safe Areas," thereby 
allowing for the possibility of 
UNPROFOR to become a belligerent 
force in the BiH conflict and conse- 
quently losing its impartiality. Wie- 
out total impartiality, UNPROFOR 
places its other missions (monitoring, 
delivering humanitarian relief, etc.) in 
jeopardy. UN member states did not, 
however, proceed in equipping 
UNPROFOR so that it could "deter at- 
tacks" against the Safe Areas. In addi- 
tion, UNPROFOR Commanders have 
constantly made it clear that they are 
not particularly inclined to enter the 
war on the side of the Muslims, given 
their experience and assessment of the 
armed conflict in BiH. The NATO mili- 
tary exclusion zones that were later 
created around two of the Safe Areas 
permitted the international commu- 
nity to get around this obstacle and 
back up the Safe Area declarations 
with military force while keeping 
UNPROFOR's impartiality relatively 
intact. 
One of the consequences of the deci- 
sion to declare Safe Areas that could 
not have been ignored by members of 
the UNSC was the manner in which 
these areas have reinforced and en- 
couraged population shifts. Since the 
beginning of the armed conflict, BiH 
has been violently transformed and 
divided by the three warring nation- 
alities (Muslim, Serb and Croat) into 
ethnically homogeneous territories. 
With the declaration that certain Mus- 
lim-controlled areas are to be consid- 
ered "Safe Areas," displaced Muslim 
civilians have either been drawn to 
these Safe Areas or literally trapped in 
them by their own forces (escape 
would weaken Muslim territorial 
claims) while the Serb civilians that 
once inhabited them (15-30% of the 
total prewar population depending on 
which Safe Area) have no illusions that 
they will be returning to them. Given 
that BiH could not be kept together as 
a unitary state following the break-up 
of the former Yugoslavia, this is not a 
negative development in that it en- 
courages the division of BiH's terri- 
tory among the three nationalities and 
thus brings the parties closer to a solu- 
tion. 
There will be a tendency for some to 
see Safe Areas as the latest example of 
western containment of refugee flows. 
This view should be nuanced, for it is 
unlikely that containment was a pri- 
mary consideration for the UNSC. As 
mentioned above, Safe Areas in the 
case of BiH (to be distinguished from 
the situation in Iraq or Rwanda) 
should be understood primarily as a 
political tool meant to show support 
for one of the parties in the conflict. 
That the creation of Safe Areas had 
consequences on the displacement of 
civilian populations and refugee flows 
is evident. However, several factors 
suggest that containment of refugee 
flows could not have been a principal 
objective of powerful and affluent 
states. Firstly, contrary to the situation 
in Iraq and Rwanda, Safe Areas were 
not created in border regions with 
thousands of uprooted civilians intent 
on crossing into neighbouring coun- 
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tries. Secondly, Safe Areas 
were created some 15 
months after hostilities 
began and much of the 
displacement had already 
occurred. Thirdly, by the 
time Safe Areas were de- 
clared, Serbia and Croatia 
had already closed their 
borders to Muslims flee- 
ing BiH, thereby greatly 
reducing the threat that 
Europe would be con- 
fronted with a large influx 
of BiH's Muslims. 
Fourthly, contrary to the 
logic of containment, sev- 
eral northwestern Euro- 
pean states continued not 
to require visas from BiH 
passport holders months 
after Safe Areas were de- 
clared. 
A closer examination of 
the situation in each par- 
ticular Safe Area also 
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gives some insight on the possible con- 
tribution and weaknesses of this new 
concept. By declaring the town of Sre- 
brenica to be a Safe Area, the UNSC 
prevented the Serbs from taking it and 
forcing the Muslim civilians to flee to 
the nearby cliffs around the village of 
Zepa. The arrival of several tens of 
thousands of displaced persons into 
the sparsely inhabited and resource- 
less Zepa area would have created a 
humanitarian crisis much worse than 
the one presently experienced by 
UNHCR in Srebrenica. Most impor- 
tantly, the Muslim leadership will now 
be able to negotiate a territorial ex- 
change agreement whereby they can 
abandon the isolated enclaves of Sre- 
brenica and Zepa in exchange for 
Sarajevo. 
Consequently, the concerned civil- 
ian populations will be transported 
and exchanged in a more secure and 
orderly fashion. This potential long- 
term solution for the displaced persons 
and local inhabitants of Srebrenica and 
Zepa also highlights the temporary 
nature of the response provided by the 
declaration of Safe Areas. The strong 
Muslim military presence in the 
Gorazde pocket suggests that the Mus- 
lims may not be willing to include 
Gorazde in a territorial exchange 
agreement, but rather, may try to link 
this enclave with the Sarajevo region, 
as was originally proposed in the latest 
Peace Plan by the Contact Group 
(USA, UK, France, Germany and 
Russia). 
The highly mediatized Sarajevo 
area will most likely be included in a 
territorial exchange agreement as it is 
becoming more ethnically homogene- 
ous: the'Serbs and Croats who have 
fled have been replaced by Muslims 
who have come to seek refuge in the 
city and its suburbs. 
The Bihac Safe Area illustrates one 
important problem if Safe Areas are to 
work in the future. The Bihac pocket 
had been relatively safe until August 
1994, when the BiH Fifth Corps (Mus- 
lims loyal to President Izetbegovic) 
launched an offensive from the Safe 
Area and took over the whole Bihac 
pocket by defeating a rebel Muslim 
army, loyal to local businessman Fikret 
Abdic, and forcing 30,000 Muslim 
refugees to flee to the neighbouring 
UN Protected Area in Croatia. In Octo- 
ber, the 5th Corps 
launched a new offen- 
sive from the Safe Area 
and managed to seize 
territory from the Serb 
forces to the south and 
to the east of the Safe 
Area (displacing 15,000 
Serbs). In the middle of 
November, Serbs from 
BiH and Croatia to- 
gether with Abdic's 
rebel Muslims 
launched a counter-of- 
fensive, regained most 
of the lost territory, and 
began threatening to 
take over the Safe Area. 
The international news 
media then proceeded 
to criticize UNPROFOR 
and NATO for not de- 
fending a UN-desig- 
nated Safe Area while 
seemingly ignoring a 
fundamental problem: 
it is difficult for the internatiinal com- 
munity to deter attacks against Safe 
Areas if they are being used by a bellig- 
erent in order to launch offensives. 
The same problem exists regarding 
the Tuzla Safe Area with the exception 
that the Muslim forces continue to be 
firmly in control of the surrounding 
territory. Military activity around/ 
within Safe Areas (including the fre- 
quent Serb harassment of the popula- 
tions within these areas) must be 
addressed in order to increase the use- 
fulness of Safe Areas as a form of pro- 
tection for civilian populations 
threatened by displacement. Demilita- 
rization appears to be one essential 
condition to make Safe Areas serve 
their temporary role. Otherwise, Safe 
Areas are likely to mirror armed con- 
flicts in that they will be full of viola- 
tions, abuse, and manipulation. 
There are many lessons to be 
learned from the UN's experience with 
the Safe Area concept. Degpite the 
many problems associated with this 
concept, the case of BiH suggests that it 
may have a positive role to play and 
can contribute toward solutions to 
problems that cause refugee flows. a 
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